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DO INSTITUTIONS MATTER? THE IMPACT OF
THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION OF THE
PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT
STEPHEN J. CHOI*
JILL E. FISCH**
A.C. PRITCHARD***
ABSTRACT
When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in
1995 (“PSLRA”), the Act’s “lead plaintiff” provision was the centerpiece
of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions.
The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors
and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the
largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead
plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the
terms of counsel’s compensation.
Congress’s stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was
to encourage institutional investors—pension funds, mutual funds, hedge
funds, etc.—to come forward to serve as lead plaintiff. The theory was that
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the Fawley Lunch, University of Michigan Law School. All of the authors are grateful for the helpful
comments provided by the participants in the April 2005 conference sponsored jointly by the
Washington University School of Law and the Institute for Law and Economic Policy.
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an institutional investor with a substantial damages claim would have the
incentive to bargain hard with class counsel on behalf of the class,
reducing the percentage of the recovery awarded to class counsel.
Congress also expected institutions to play an oversight role, monitoring to
make sure that class counsel was vigorously pursuing claims on behalf of
the class and not settling claims on the cheap.
Our study offers evidence on the extent to which the lead plaintiff
provision furthers these goals. We have collected two samples of securities
class actions—one from 1991 to 1995 (pre-PSLRA) and one from 1996 to
2000 (post-PSLRA). We compare the class representatives from the two
periods to determine if institutional investors are stepping forward in
significantly greater numbers. We also sort the institutional investors—
distinguishing public from private—to see what types of investors have
stepped forward to serve as lead plaintiff. Consistent with other research,
we find a significant difference only in the number of public institutions
serving as lead plaintiff.
Our sample also allows us to analyze the impact of the lead plaintiff
provision: Does the presence of an institutional investor increase the
likelihood of a high-value settlement? Despite the visible participation of
institutions in several high-profile cases, we find no systematic evidence
that private institutional lead plaintiffs are associated with larger class
recoveries. Public pension fund lead plaintiffs, on the other hand, are
correlated with higher class recoveries as a fraction of the potential
damage award in the post-PSLRA period. Our results are, however,
consistent with the possibility that public pensions “cherry-pick” the
actions in which they seek to become lead plaintiff, selecting only the
cases with the largest potential damages and the strongest evidence of
fraud. Further analysis is needed to evaluate this possibility.
We also evaluate the effect of lead plaintiffs on the selection of
attorneys and attorneys’ fees. We find that, for the time period of our
study, institutional investors tended to avoid the Milberg Weiss plaintiffs’
attorney firm. On the more fundamental issue of whether the presence of
an institutional investor as a lead plaintiff reduces the fees paid to the
lawyers, after controlling for the size of the case, we find no systematic
evidence that institutional involvement correlates with lower fee awards.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Congress adopted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”)1 in response to widespread claims of frivolous securities fraud
litigation. The PSLRA contains a variety of provisions designed to limit
litigation and to reduce the settlement value of non-meritorious or
nuisance claims. These provisions include a heightened pleading
requirement,2 a safe harbor from liability for forward-looking statements,3
a requirement that plaintiffs prove loss causation,4 a mandatory discovery
stay pending a motion to dismiss,5 and the replacement of joint and several
liability with proportionate liability for collateral defendants.6
The PSLRA also contains a novel provision aimed at increasing client
control over litigation—the lead plaintiff provision. This provision
requires the court to appoint a statutory lead plaintiff in all securities fraud
class actions to oversee the litigation.7 The provision also establishes a
rebuttable presumption that, among those motioning to become lead
plaintiff, the plaintiff with the largest financial interest in the relief sought
by the class will be selected as the lead plaintiff.8 Finally, the lead plaintiff
provision vests the lead plaintiff selected with authority to select and retain
class counsel.9
Almost ten years have passed since the adoption of the PSLRA—
presumably enough time to assess the statute’s effects. A variety of
empirical studies have examined these effects. In particular, studies have
sought to determine whether plaintiffs file fewer frivolous cases
subsequent to the enactment of the statute,10 whether the statute affects the
1. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-1 to 78j-1 (2000)
[hereinafter “PSLRA”].
2. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000).
3. See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); id. § 21E.
4. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4).
5. See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A; id. § 21D(b)(4).
6. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(f). Outside directors also enjoy proportionate
liability under Section 11 of the Securities Act. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(f)(2).
7. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(B).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(v).
10. See Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More? The
Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2007).
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rate at which cases are dismissed,11 and whether the statute deters the
filing of some meritorious claims.12
To date, however, few studies have looked at whether the lead plaintiff
provision is achieving its intended goals. Are institutional investors
responding to the congressional invitation and seeking appointment as lead
plaintiffs, or has the adoption of the PSLRA made little difference in the
identity of class representatives in securities fraud litigation? Are
particular types of institutions, such as public pension funds, becoming
generally more active, or is their involvement limited to a handful of highvisibility, large-stakes cases? Most important from a policy perspective,
does institutional involvement matter? Does institutional service as lead
plaintiff correlate with higher recoveries or lower attorneys’ fees? If so,
are there reasons to suspect a causal relationship?
This Article offers empirical evidence on the effects of the lead
plaintiff provision. By comparing two case samples, one of cases filed
prior to the adoption of the PSLRA and the other from the post-PSLRA
period, the Article analyzes whether the level or type of institutional
involvement has changed. The Article goes on to assess the post-PSLRA
effect of institutional involvement in general, and public pension fund
involvement in particular, on recoveries and attorneys’ fees.
Our study’s findings offer modest support for the lead plaintiff
provision. The study finds that, although the adoption of the PSLRA did
not lead to increased involvement by private institutions, it did correlate
with a substantial increase in involvement by public pension funds. The
effects of this involvement are less clear. We find that public pension
funds are significantly correlated with high-value outcome cases, defined
as outcomes involving a settlement of more than five percent of the stakes.
We are unable to rule out, however, the possibility that public pension
funds may simply be cherry-picking—choosing to become involved
mainly in high-profile cases in which the likelihood of liability and the
recoverable damages are the highest. Similarly, despite anecdotal evidence
suggesting that public pension funds have increased market discipline over
fee agreements, we find no significant effect on attorneys’ fee awards.
11. See A.C. Pritchard & Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions
to Dismiss Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 125
(2005).
12. See Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After The Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act?, 23 J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2007).
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It is unclear how to interpret these results. As institutional involvement
has grown very slowly since the adoption of the PSLRA, it is possible that
institutions are still learning how to exercise their authority effectively and
that, with continued involvement, they will reduce the agency costs in
securities fraud litigation. Alternatively, agency problems and political
factors may be too much for institutional investors to overcome, leaving
them largely unable to realize the objectives intended by Congress.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II briefly sets out the background
and purposes of the PSLRA. Part III describes existing evidence of the
effects of the lead plaintiff provision. Part IV explains the hypotheses that
we seek to test in this study. Part V describes our data set. Part VI presents
our empirical tests and findings. Part VII considers the broader
implications of the study and suggests additional avenues for future
research.
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSES OF THE PSLRA
The PSLRA was enacted over President Clinton’s veto13 following an
extensive lobbying campaign by accounting firms, corporate leaders and
members of the securities industry, who complained that plaintiffs’
lawyers were filing excessive and frivolous cookie-cutter complaints,
often on the basis of no more than a sudden drop in stock price, in an
effort to coerce nuisance settlements.14 Critics described meritless lawsuits
as having a “blackmail effect” and forcing “innocent” firms to settle rather
than endure the high costs of vindicating themselves through litigation.15
Members of Congress relied heavily on empirical research by Janet
Cooper Alexander16 reporting that securities fraud class actions were
13. See Joel Seligman, The Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 725
(1996).
14. See John Harwood, House, in 325–99 Vote, Approves Bill To Curb Fraud Suits Against
Companies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1995, at A3 (describing industry concerns); see also Jeffrey Taylor,
Accountants’ Campaign Contributions Are About To Pay Off in Legislation on Lawsuit Protection,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A22 (detailing lobbying efforts by accounting firms for securities
litigation reform).
15. Peter M. Saparoff, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Illusion or Reality,
in 2 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE OF STUDY MATERIALS: SECURITIES LITIGATION: PLANNING AND
STRATEGIES FOR THE ‘90S AND BEYOND 505, 507 (1996).
16. See Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1991). Alexander’s study has been criticized. See, e.g., Leonard
B. Simon & William S. Dato, Legislating on a False Foundation: The Erroneous Academic
Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 959,
964 (1996) (arguing that Alexander’s study contained methodological errors and erroneous
conclusions).
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settled without regard for the merits of their claims at a formulaic twentyfive cents on the dollar.17
Congress’s perception that securities fraud class actions were “lawyerdriven litigation” was a separate, although related, concern.18 Congress
heard testimony that lawyers maintained stocks of professional plaintiffs,
willing to file suit at the lawyer’s request. Class representatives seemed to
have little involvement in or control over litigation decisions. Perhaps
most important, lawsuit outcomes appeared to favor the interests of class
counsel over the class itself—generally resulting in substantial fee awards
but often providing limited compensation to class members.19
The PSLRA responded to these concerns in several ways. It attempted
to reduce frivolous litigation by enacting a variety of procedural and
substantive hurdles to litigation. These hurdles included an enhanced
pleading requirement which requires plaintiffs to state with particularity,
in a complaint alleging fraud under Rule 10b-5 or other antifraud
provisions of the Exchange Act, “facts giving rise to a strong inference
that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”20 The statute
adopted a safe harbor for forward-looking statements designed to reduce
the litigation risk associated with making predictions or estimates that
were subsequently not met.21 This provision was intended to provide
particular protection to high technology issuers, for whom failure to meet
projections had resulted in frequent litigation. The PSLRA added section
21D(b)(4) to the Exchange Act, an affirmative requirement that plaintiffs
17. See Simon & Dato, supra note 16, at 960 n.4 (citing examples of congressional reliance on
Alexander’s study).
18. See John Harwood, House Votes Bill Requiring Losing Party To Pay Winner's Fees in
Certain Suits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 1995, at A3 (describing a series of legal reform bills as originating
in the GOP’s “Contract with America”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-50, at § 202 (1995) (provision of
the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act of 1995 entitled “Prevention of Lawyer-Driven Litigation”).
19. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 36 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730
(observing that lawyers “often receive a disproportionate share of settlement awards”); S. REP. NO.
104-98, at 9 (1995) (complaining that, although investors recover only “pennies on the dollar,” much
of the $1.4 billion paid during 1994 alone went to plaintiffs’ lawyers).
20. Securities Exchange of 1934 § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2000). The “strong inference”
language of the statute has generated substantial controversy in the courts due to inconsistencies in
various components of the legislative history. Compare Janas v. McCracken (In re Silicon Graphics
Sec. Litig.), 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that PSLRA requires plaintiff to plead
“deliberate recklessness”), with Press v. Chem. Inventory Services Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 538 (2d Cir.
1999) (interpreting statute as codifying prior Second Circuit approach, which required only facts
giving rise to a strong inference of recklessness). The plaintiff is also required to identify specific
misleading statements, to state why they are misleading, and to state with particularity the basis for all
pleadings made on information and belief.
21. See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77 (2000); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 21E.
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prove loss causation.22 Loss causation is an element of securities fraud,
borrowed by the courts from negligence law, that requires the plaintiff to
establish a sufficient causal nexus between the defendant’s
misrepresentations and the plaintiff’s loss.23 Congress also responded to
concerns about discovery costs by imposing a mandatory stay of discovery
while a motion to dismiss was pending.24
In addition, the PSLRA included several other limitations designed to
reduce the expected value of securities fraud litigation to both the plaintiff
class and its lawyers. The statute substituted proportionate liability for
joint and several liability, providing that defendants, other than those who
knowingly violate the securities laws, will only be liable for that portion of
the judgment that corresponds to their responsibility for the fraud.25
Section 21D(e) modestly limited the damages available in fraud-on-themarket cases.26 Finally, the statute restricted fee awards to a reasonable
percentage of the damages actually paid to the plaintiff class.27
In an effort to ameliorate the problem of lawyer control, the PSLRA
attempted to increase the role of the class representative.28 The PSLRA
created the role of a statutory lead plaintiff. Lawyers filing a securities
fraud class action are required to publish a notice of the filing, and, within
ninety days of that notice, the court must appoint a lead plaintiff.29 The
statute instructs the court to appoint as lead plaintiff the class member
“most capable of adequately representing the interests of class members,”
and provides a rebuttable presumption that the most adequate plaintiff,
among those seeking to become lead plaintiff, is “the person or group of
persons that . . . has the largest financial interest in the relief sought by the
class.”30 The lead plaintiff is then charged with overseeing the litigation
22. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(4).
23. Recently, the Supreme Court held that loss causation requires more than an allegation that the
fraud inflated the price of the security. Plaintiffs must also plead that the fraud caused the plaintiff’s
“economic loss.” Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 125 S. Ct. 1627, 1634 (2005).
24. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(b)(3)(B).
25. See id. § 21D(f). Proportionate liability applies for antifraud causes of action under the
Exchange Act. Section 11(f) of the Securities Act extends the proportionate liability regime to outside
directors facing liability. See Securities Act of 1933 § 27A.
26. PSLRA § 101(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u4(e)(1) (2000); see Nathaniel Carden, Comment,
Implications of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 for Judicial Presumptions of
Market Efficiency, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 894 (1998) (examining and criticizing this limitation).
27. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(6).
28. See John C. Coffee Jr., The PSLRA and Auctions, N.Y.L.J., May 17, 2001, at 5–6 (explaining
that the legislative history of the PSLRA clearly indicated that Congress wanted to replace “lawyerdriven” litigation with “client-driven” litigation).
29. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21D(a)(3)(A)–(B).
30. Id. § 21D(a)(3)(B). In addition, the lead plaintiff must satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id. § 21D(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I)(cc).
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and, most importantly, is given the statutory authority to select and retain
class counsel, subject to the approval of the court.31 The premise of the
provision, inspired by a proposal by Elliott Weiss and John Beckerman,
was that it would increase the participation of sophisticated plaintiffs with
substantial stakes, who would have the appropriate incentives to monitor
class counsel.32 Weiss and Beckerman also predicted that the repeated
participation of large investors would increase market discipline of
attorneys’ fee awards.33
A number of empirical studies have offered evidence on whether the
PSLRA has been effective in meeting Congress’s goals. These studies, of
course, have their limitations. For example, a study by the National
Economics Research Associates (“NERA”) reports a statistically
significant growth trend in filings since 1991 but, controlling for that
trend, finds that the PSLRA had no statistically significant impact on
filings.34 Michael Perino finds that the passage of the PSLRA is correlated
with an increased number of issuers facing a securities fraud suit.35 These
results suggest that the statute has not been effective in reducing the
quantity of litigation. On the other hand, an analysis of filing statistics
does not control for the amount of fraud during the time period, nor does it
indicate whether the nature of the litigation has shifted to favor high
quality cases. Marilyn Johnson, Karen Nelson, and Adam Pritchard find
that filings after the PSLRA correlate more strongly with factors related to
merit.36 Their study suggests that the PSLRA has shifted litigation away
from weak claims and toward stronger cases. Another possibility,
consistent with this finding, is that the PSLRA has also reduced the filing
of meritorious cases. A study by Stephen Choi shows that the litigation
31. Id. § 21D(a)(3).
32. See Elliott J. Weiss & John S. Beckerman, Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How
Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 YALE L.J. 2053
(1995); S. REP. NO. 104-98, at 11 n.32 (1995) (stating that the Weiss and Beckerman article “provided
the basis for the ‘most adequate plaintiff’ provision”).
33. See Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 32, at 2106–07.
34. See ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., NATIONAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, RECENT
TRENDS IN SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: WILL ENRON AND SARBANES-OXLEY CHANGE
THE TIDES? 4 (2003), available at http://www.nera.com/Publication.asp?p_ID=115&login=6923124.
Nor did the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 affect the number of filings. Id.
35. See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 913, 932 (2003). Perino argues that this increase may be due to efforts by plaintiffs’ lawyers to
seek increased portfolio diversification by bringing more actions and reducing their investment in each
case. Id. at 936–37.
36. See Johnson et al., supra note 10.
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barriers of the PSLRA are deterring some non-nuisance suits that lack
“hard evidence” of fraud.37
III. EFFECTS OF THE LEAD PLAINTIFF PROVISION
The effectiveness of the lead plaintiff provision is a matter of some
dispute. It is uncontroverted that the number of institutions participating as
lead plaintiffs following the adoption of the PSLRA was initially quite
small. In a report on the first year of practice under the PSLRA, the SEC
reported that institutional investors became lead plaintiffs in only eight of
105 filed cases.38 A study of the following year found nine institutional
lead plaintiffs in 175 cases.39 Academic commentary has generally
reported that the PSLRA has been unsuccessful in encouraging
institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiffs.40 Commentators have
particularly highlighted the total failure of certain types of institutional
investors, such as mutual funds, to participate.41
More recent data suggest that institutional participation is increasing. A
rough analysis of cases filed in 2001 found institutions serving as lead
plaintiffs in approximately 10% of the cases.42 A 2004 study released by
Cornerstone Research reports that institutions have served as lead
plaintiffs in approximately 30% of post-PSLRA cases through December
2003, a figure that Cornerstone described as a substantial increase from the
pre-PSLRA participation rate.43 A PricewaterhouseCoopers study reported
37. See Choi, supra note 12.
38. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 1995, at 51 (1997).
39. Elayne Demby, Ducking Lead Plaintiff Status, (May 1999), http://www.assetpub.com/
archive/ps/99-05psmay/may99PS58a.html.
40. See, e.g., Farah Z. Usmani, Note, Inequities in the Resolution of Securities Disputes:
Individual or Class Action; Arbitration or Litigation, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 193, 203 (2001)
(stating that “[t]he new rules regarding lead plaintiff have not succeeded in encouraging more
institutional investors to serve as lead plaintiffs”); Tiffany M. Wong, Note, Defendants' Standing to
Oppose Lead Plaintiff Appointment Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 2003
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 833, 844 (2003) (stating that “empirical evidence indicates that the PSLRA may not
have achieved its intended effects of . . . encouraging more institutional investors to serve as lead
plaintiffs”).
41. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., “When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes”: Myth and Reality about the
Synthesis of Private Counsel and Public Client, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 241, 247 (2001) (observing that
“possibly the most noteworthy fact about the lead plaintiff selection process is that since the passage of
the PSLRA, private institutional investors have virtually never volunteered for this role—while they
do sometimes opt out and sue individually”).
42. See Edward R. Becker et al., Panel Discussion, The Private Securities Law Reform Act: Is it
Working?, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2363 (2003).
43. See LAURA E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT
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that institutional investors represented 51% and 42% of lead plaintiffs,
respectively, in all securities class actions filed in 2002 and 2003.44 In
1996, union and public pension funds served as lead plaintiffs in less than
3% of all cases filed.45 By 2003, the number increased to 28%.46
The data on the effects of institutional participation are more limited.
PricewaterhouseCoopers has reported that, since the adoption of the
PSLRA, cases led by government or union pension funds have settled for
six times as much as cases lacking a public pension fund lead plaintiff.47
The report does not indicate any attempt to control for the size of the case,
however. Public pension funds are particularly likely to participate in
cases involving large public companies, both because of the high profile
nature of those cases and because the dollar amounts of their losses are
likely to be higher. As a result, we would expect to see those cases settle
for a higher dollar amount, at least in absolute terms.48
The increase in institutional participation in recent years may be due to
several factors. One factor is increased experience under the PSLRA. As
courts become more uniform in their interpretation of the lead plaintiff
provision and institutions more experienced with the lead plaintiff role, the
benefits of participation are more likely to outweigh the costs in a given
case. A second factor is the evolving judicial preference for a single
institutional lead plaintiff over a large group of individuals. Courts in
some early post-PSLRA cases appeared to endorse the idea that plaintiffs’
lawyers could cobble together a group of hundreds or even thousands of
lead plaintiffs and aggregate their losses.49 The more plaintiffs a lawyer
SECURITIES LAWSUITS: SETTLEMENTS REPORTED THROUGH DECEMBER 2003, at 9 (2004), available
at http://www.cornerstone.com/fram_res.html.
44. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 6, http://www.10b5.
com/2003_study.pdf.
45. Id.
46. See id. (reporting that unions and public pension funds were lead plaintiffs in 27% of cases in
2002 and 28% in 2003).
47. See Steven Skalak & Daniel Dooley, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLP, SECURITIES
LITIGATION SERVICES: REPORT SECURITIES LITIGATION UPDATE—THE PENSION FUND FACTOR 1
(2004), available at http://www.10b5.com/SecLit_Study_Pension_Fund_Supplement_jan04.pdf.
48. See LAURIE E. SIMMONS & ELLEN M. RYAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, POST-REFORM ACT
SECURITIES SETTLEMENTS: UPDATED THROUGH DECEMBER 2004, at 9 (2005), available at
http://securities.cornerstone.com/pdfs/Settlements_2004.pdf (explaining that part of the effect of
institutional participation is the consequence of institutions participating in larger cases). The
Cornerstone study states that “even after controlling for ‘estimated damages’ . . . the presence of an
institutional investor as lead plaintiff is associated with a statistically significant increase in settlement
size.” Id. The study offers no details, however, about the controls used.
49. See Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation, Auctions and Other Developments in the Selection of Lead
Counsel under the PSLRA, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 67–68 (2001) (describing evolving
judicial approach to aggregation).
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could attract, the greater the likelihood that the lawyer would win the
contest of having the collection of investors with the largest stake in the
case. Courts increasingly have rejected this practice. A third factor is the
bursting of the tech bubble and the subsequent market downturn, coupled
with widespread reports of corporate misconduct at companies such as
Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. These events generated substantial losses
for many investors and focused heightened attention on accountability for
fraud. Finally, the record settlement in the Cendant litigation, involving a
group of three prominent public pension funds as lead plaintiffs, may have
signaled to institutions the potential value of active participation.50
Although the studies are consistent with overall increased institutional
participation, the increase does not appear to have been uniform. Public
pension funds appear to have been considerably more active than other
institutions. When one examines participation by institutions other than
public pension funds, such as hedge funds, private pension funds, and
trusts,51 the nature and effect of institutional participation becomes murky.
It may also be difficult, particularly with some smaller investors, to
determine whether they should be classified as institutions or individuals.52
Importantly, these other institutions differ substantially from each other
and from the large public pension fund or mutual fund that Weiss and
Beckerman (and Congress) projected as the prototypical institutional lead
plaintiff. These differences may go to the issue of whether the institutions
are capable of responsibly serving as lead plaintiffs. Weiss and Beckerman
assumed, with little discussion, that institutions will be typical and
adequate representatives of other class members.53 Accordingly, Weiss
and Beckerman devoted relatively little attention to exploring the ways in
which institutional investors’ interests might diverge from those of the rest
of the class. Similarly, Weiss and Beckerman focused on the institution as
a singular entity, ignoring agency problems among actors within an
50. See, e.g., Sherie R. Savett, Securities Class Actions Since the 1995 Reform Act: A Plaintiff’s
Perspective, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE
2004, at 27 (2004) (reporting that trend of increased involvement by public pension funds began
shortly after the announcement of the “landmark” $2.8 billion Cendant settlement in 1999).
51. We have identified a handful of other lead plaintiffs that appear to be institutions but for
which we cannot obtain detailed information.
52. Although our study is challenged by data limitations, we note that courts have been subject to
similar problems. See, e.g., Malasky v. IAC/Interactive Corp, No. 04 CIV. 7447 (RJH), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3628, at *4–6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2005) (revising lead plaintiff appointment after learning that
plaintiff “New Hayward Holdings,” which was originally represented to be “a corporation engaged in
financial money management,” was in fact a personal investment vehicle of an individual investor).
53. See, e.g., Weiss & Beckerman, supra note 32, at 2109 (“In class actions in which institutional
investors serve as lead plaintiffs, questions relating to typicality rarely should arise.”).
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institutional investor that might impede the institution’s ability to act in the
interests of its own beneficiaries (and other members of the class).
Weiss and Beckerman also endorsed institutional involvement based on
the perception that institutional investors held substantial stakes, which
would create appropriate incentives for them to monitor litigation
decisions, and had the sophistication that would enable them to do so
effectively.54 Institutional status, however, is a noisy proxy for having a
substantial stake in the litigation. Many institutional lead plaintiffs are
quite small and have relatively minor stakes.55 Similarly, many smaller
institutions lack any particular sophistication. It is unclear why these
institutions should be analyzed as distinct from individual lead plaintiffs
with similar size stakes or why we should expect the institutions to add
distinctive value to litigation.
Mutual funds have failed to participate in securities fraud litigation at
all, despite their substantial holdings. As Third Circuit Judge Edward
Becker explains, mutual funds were the institutions that Congress really
expected to serve as lead plaintiffs because of their substantial share of the
securities market.56 Not only have mutual funds failed to serve as lead
plaintiffs at all,57 but many of them do not even bother to file proof of
claim forms to collect their share of litigation settlements.58 Recent
lawsuits have alleged that mutual funds, in particular, are leaving billions
of dollars on the table by failing to submit claim forms.59
There are at least two obvious possible explanations for the failure of
mutual funds to participate as lead plaintiffs. The first is the standard
agency problem. Litigation decisions are made by mutual fund managers
who are evaluated on the basis of fund performance relative to other funds
54. Id. at 2095 (“Institutions’ large stakes give them an incentive to monitor, and institutions
have or readily could develop the expertise necessary to assess whether plaintiffs' attorneys are acting
as faithful champions for the plaintiff class.”).
55. For example, Nature Shoes, Inc., lead plaintiff in a suit against Citrix, Inc., had a stake
consisting of four calls, at a price of $400 each. Complaint at 5, Nature Shoes, Inc. v. Citrix Systems,
Inc., No. 97-6234 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 1997), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/1002/CTXS97/
001.html.
56. See Becker et al., supra note 42, at 2369.
57. Id.
58. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers:
Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in
Securities Class Action Settlements, 58 STAN. L. REV. 411 (2005) (reporting evidence obtained from
securities claims administrators that institutions are failing frequently to file securities class action
claims).
59. See, e.g., Securities Litigation Watch, http://slw.issproxy.com/ (Jan. 25, 2005) (describing
lawsuits against over 40 mutual fund managers alleging that they had failed to collect $2 billion worth
of settlement proceeds by failing to file claim forms).
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and market benchmarks. Litigation recoveries do not go to fund managers,
but to fund beneficiaries.60 Because of the time lag between the fund’s
trading and the resolution of litigation, litigation recoveries may not be
fully reflected in performance figures. At the same time, a mutual fund’s
participation as lead plaintiff would draw public attention to the fact that
the fund has been the victim of fraud, perhaps reflecting adversely on the
expertise of the fund’s managers. The second, and perhaps more
important, explanation is that a substantial component of business for the
major mutual funds involves managing retirement accounts for publicly
traded issuers. Unlike litigation recoveries, the fees associated with these
services go directly to mutual fund managers. Fund managers might
reasonably be concerned that active litigation participation would hurt
their ability to compete for this business from managers of public
companies.61
Hedge funds reflect a distinct group of institutional investors that has
the potential to play a meaningful role in securities litigation.62 Hedge
funds, due to their investing strategies, often have substantial stakes in
particular companies. Hedge funds are typically sophisticated investors.
The ability of hedge funds to hold concentrated interests rather than a
diversified portfolio, coupled with the metrics by which hedge fund
performance is measured, increase the likelihood that hedge fund
managers will benefit from a litigation recovery relative to mutual fund
managers. On the other hand, due to the distinctive trading strategies
employed by hedge funds, these are the institutions most likely to face
typicality objections to their taking the lead plaintiff position.63
An additional factor that may affect the effectiveness of institutional
oversight is the structure of institutional participation. Prior to the adoption
of the PSLRA, many institutions were part of what was effectively a group
60. Interestingly, at least one case has rejected the application of a hedge fund as lead plaintiff on
the basis that it was not a buyer for its own account, but rather was standing “in the place of whatever
number of investors are participants in its managed fund.” In re Bank One Shareholders Class Actions,
96 F. Supp. 2d 780, 784 (N.D. Ill. 2000). This reasoning, despite being rather difficult to square with
Congress’s purposes in adopting the lead plaintiff provision, might deter mutual funds from seeking
lead plaintiff status.
61. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. O’BARR & JOHN M. CONLEY, FORTUNE AND FOLLY: THE WEALTH
AND POWER OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING (1992) (reporting concern by mutual fund managers and
other institutions such as banks about avoiding litigation in order to maintain the ability to sell
products and services to defendant issuers).
62. See, e.g., In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 01-425-SLR, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17094
(D. Del. Oct. 6, 2003) (appointing four hedge funds as lead plaintiffs).
63. See, e.g., In re Bank One, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 783–84 (rejecting lead plaintiff application by
hedge fund that had engaged in extensive day trading including shorting of the issuer’s stock).
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of plaintiffs that also included a number of individual investors.64 Courts
have disagreed on whether groups should be appointed as lead plaintiffs
under the PSLRA.65 Despite several decisions criticizing the appointment
of unrelated investors as a lead plaintiff group, it remains commonplace
for courts to appoint institutional investors, particularly smaller institutions
(including public pension funds) as co-lead plaintiffs together with one or
more individual investors.66 In some post-PSLRA cases, courts have
appointed groups of public pension funds to serve as lead plaintiff.67
It is unclear whether the potential effectiveness of institutional
participation is reduced when an institution serves as a member of a mixed
lead plaintiff group. Courts and commentators that have criticized the use
of lead plaintiff groups argue that such groups are often formed by counsel
and as a result do not exert the type of lawyer control that was the
objective of the PSLRA.68 If this is true, institutional participation as part
of a group may not be as effective in monitoring counsel, and we would
not expect such groups to have a significant effect on fee awards or fee
structures. Moreover, the appointment of a lead plaintiff group can lead to
64. See, e.g., In re Biogen Sec. Litig., 179 F.R.D. 25 (D. Mass. 1997) (lead plaintiffs consisted of
World Futures Trading Company and five individuals). Existing data does not allow us to determine
whether, prior to the PSLRA, these plaintiffs functioned as formal groups or simply collections of
plaintiffs who had filed separate cases.
65. Compare In re Telxon Corp. Sec. Litig., 67 F. Supp. 2d 803, 811–16 (N.D. Ohio 1999)
(rejecting the argument that a lead plaintiff should consist of a group of unrelated investors) with In re
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that “rule of reason” should be
applied to determine whether size and nature of group appointment is appropriate). See also Brief of
the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants on the Issues
Specified at 17 n.13, In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (Nos. 00-2769, 00-3653),
(endorsing concept of lead plaintiff group but arguing that group should consist of no more than five
members).
66. See, e.g., Tice v. Novastar Fin., Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16800, at *29 (W.D. Mo. Aug.
23, 2004) (appointing institution and two individuals to “ensure a broader, more diverse representation
of the class”); In re Party City Sec. Litig., 189 F.R.D. 91, 114 (D.N.J. 1999) (appointing individual and
institutional investors as co-lead plaintiffs); In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc., Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42,
47–49 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explicitly endorsing joint appointment of institution and several individuals
on the basis that it would result in “diverse representation”).
67. We acknowledge that the concerns about the effectiveness of members of a lead plaintiff
group are reduced when the group consists exclusively of institutional investors. Indeed, the lead
plaintiffs in the Cendant litigation consisted of three large public pension funds. On the other hand,
even in the Cendant case, the group structure presented some conflicts, particularly as to the
appropriate fee award. See Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction Block: Evaluating the Selection of
Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 717 n.363 (2002) (describing failure of two of
the institutions to take a position on the fee issue). See also In Re Cardinal Health Inc. Sec. Litig., 226
F.R.D. 298, 306–07 (S.D. Ohio 2005) (considering objections to appointment of six unrelated public
pension funds).
68. See, e.g., Telxon, 67 F. Supp. 2d at 811–16 (stating that appointment of unrelated groups
would thwart legislative purpose of greater client control); Fisch, supra note 49, at 69–77 (arguing for
narrow reading of the statutory term “group”).
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a fractured position among group members or cause some members to
refrain from active participation.69
We consider possible institutional differences by coding public pension
funds separately from other institutions to explore the issue of whether any
identified changes in litigation should be attributed to the participation of
public pension funds or to institutions more generally. Our data do not
permit full exploration of the effects of lead plaintiff groups, but we
identify the issue for further research.
IV. HYPOTHESES
In this Part, we develop a series of hypotheses based on Congress’s
purposes in adopting the lead plaintiff provision and anecdotal evidence
relating to its effects. We construct propositions that we can test
empirically using our data set and accepted statistical methodologies.
Congress’s most conspicuous purpose in adopting the lead plaintiff
provision was to encourage institutions to become more involved as lead
plaintiffs. The anecdotal evidence discussed above, however, suggests that
private institutions such as mutual funds have been reluctant to step
forward to represent the class in securities fraud litigation. By contrast,
public pension funds have stepped forward to take the lead plaintiff role in
a number of high profile class actions, such as Cendant, Enron, and
WorldCom.
H1: Private institutions are no more likely to represent the class in
the post-PSLRA period.
H2: Public pension funds are more likely to represent the class in
the post-PSLRA period.
The Enron litigation suggests another hypothesis: Institutions are more
willing to bear the costs of serving as lead plaintiff only in the higheststakes cases with the most egregious evidence of fraud. One weakness of
the PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision is that it does not provide a
mechanism for compensating the lead plaintiff for its efforts in monitoring
the litigation. The costs to the lead plaintiff of monitoring counsel are
largely fixed; negotiating with counsel and supervising the attorneys’ work
may take as much time and effort in a small case as in a large one. If those
69. See, e.g., Kloster v. McColl (In re BankAmerica Corp. Sec. Litig.), 350 F.3d 747 (8th Cir.
2003) (describing inability of lead plaintiff group to agree on whether to approve or object to proposed
settlement and failure of some group members even to take a position); see also Fisch, supra note 67,
at 717 n.363 (describing reported problems with lead plaintiff groups).
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costs are non-trivial, institutional investors are likely to be willing to serve
as lead plaintiff only when their returns from service (in the form of their
pro rata share of increased net compensation, after subtracting attorneys’
fees) are likely to be substantial. Is the willingness of public pension funds
to serve as lead plaintiff a pervasive phenomenon, or is it simply an
artifact of a handful of salient, high-stakes lawsuits?70
H3: Public pension funds are more likely to represent the class when
the potential damage awards from litigation (the “stakes”) are
greater and the evidence of fraud is stronger.
Congress’s efforts to encourage institutions to serve as lead plaintiffs
had a particular goal—to put investors in control of securities fraud class
actions. A high-profile target for criticism during the hearings leading up
to the enactment of the PSLRA was Bill Lerach, a named partner in the
leading plaintiffs’ firm Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach. Lerach
took particular heat for his boast that: “I have the greatest practice in the
world because I have no clients.”71 The lead plaintiff provision was
intended to change the relationship between the class representative and
counsel, ensuring that there would be a “client” to oversee the efforts of
the lawyers. Institutional investors, particularly those who are interested in
overseeing the litigation actively, are unlikely to favor attorneys who are
unresponsive to client concerns and who insist on exercising complete
authority over litigation strategy. On the other hand, Milberg Weiss
dominated securities fraud litigation during the time period of our study.72
The firm was by far the largest of the traditional plaintiffs’ firms,73 and its
size may correlate with greater expertise in litigating class actions and
70. An alternative explanation for a correlation between litigation stakes and public pension fund
involvement is that the publicity surrounding a large-stakes case is likely much greater than for a
small-stakes case. To the extent public pension fund managers (or the politicians to whom the
managers answer) desire publicity, perhaps for political purposes, they will gravitate to only the largerstake cases. We do not attempt to distinguish this alternative explanation in this Article. For more on
the political pressures facing public pension fund managers, see Roberta Romano, Public Pension
Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795 (1993).
71. See In re Network Associates, Inc., Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(quoting law firm partner William Lerach).
72. See William S. Lerach, “The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995—27 Months
Later”: Securities Class Action Litigation Under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s Brave
New World, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 597, 606 (1998) (stating that Milberg, Weiss was involved in
approximately thirty-one percent of securities fraud class actions before the adoption of the PSLRA
and fifty-nine percent after the adoption of the statute).
73. On May 1, 2004, the firm split into two parts: Milberg, Weiss, Bershad & Schulman LLP,
based in New York City, and Lerach, Coughlin, Stoia, Geller, Rudman & Robbins LLP, based in San
Diego. See Milberg, Weiss, Bershad & Schulman LLP, http://www.milberg.com/ (last visited Mar. 21,
2005).
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greater resources to commit to cases. Do institutions select firms other
than Milberg Weiss to represent the class?
H4: Institutions are less likely to select Milberg Weiss as lead
counsel for the class.
The point of putting institutions in charge of class actions was to
impose more careful monitoring on class counsel. Congress believed that
plaintiffs’ lawyers tended to produce too little and charge too much.
Specifically, Congress indicated a concern that risk-averse plaintiffs’
attorneys, rather than risk losing any return on a substantial investment in
a case, might settle the action for less than a more highly motivated
attorney would demand.74 Institutional investor plaintiffs are likely to be
better diversified than their counsel and thus more willing to bear the risk
of a summary judgment motion or a trial if necessary to gain a larger
settlement or judgment. Institutional investors, it was thought, would
discourage counsel from settling on the cheap, thereby increasing the
accountability of defendants.
On the question of overcharging, prior to the adoption of the PSLRA,
the typical fee award was 25% to 33% of the class recovery.75 There
appeared to be little variation with the stakes involved in the case, the
likelihood of recovery, or the amount of effort that was necessary to
produce the award.76 Congress believed that institutions would bargain
hard on behalf of the plaintiff class, demanding a lower percentage fee
award in larger cases and perhaps structuring fee agreements in order to
provide attorneys with the incentive to produce better results for the class.
H5: Institutional involvement correlates with greater recovery for
the class, all other things being equal.
H6: Institutional involvement correlates with lower fees for class
counsel, all other things being equal.
V. THE SAMPLE AND DATA
To assess the impact of the lead plaintiff provision, we created two
samples, a pre-PSLRA sample of firms sued under Rule 10b-5 with class
74. See John W. Avery, Securities Litigation Reform: The Genesis of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act, 51 BUS. LAW. 335, 372 (1996).
75. See Lisa L. Casey, Reforming Securities Class Actions from the Bench: Judging Fiduciaries
and Fiduciary Judging, 2003 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1239, 1253–54.
76. Id.

p 869 Choi Fisch Pritchard book pages.doc

886

4/20/2006

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY

[VOL. 83:869

periods ending in 1991 to 1995 and a post-PSLRA sample of firms sued
with class periods ending between 1996 and 2000.77 We stopped collecting
data in 2000 to provide ample time to determine the resolution of the
suits.78
To make data collection tractable, we started with the sample used by
Johnson, Nelson, and Pritchard.79 Because that sample focused on firms in
the computer hardware (Standard Industrial Code (“SIC”) 357) and
computer software (SIC 737) industries, we supplemented the sample with
an equal number of randomly selected sued firms in other industries. This
broader sample makes our findings more generalizable. We excluded those
firms where we could not find information on the identity of the lead
plaintiff, leaving us with a total sample of 204 firms. Table 1A breaks
down the sample by year, and Table 1B shows the industry breakdown.
The pre-PSLRA sample contains 82 firms (40.2%) and the post-PSLRA
sample contains 122 (59.8%).
TABLE 1A: SAMPLE BY CLASS PERIOD END YEAR
Class end
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Total

Frequency
12
18
13
21
18
20
25
30
27
20
204

Percentage of Total Sample
5.9
8.8
6.4
10.3
8.8
9.8
12.3
14.7
13.2
9.8
100.0

77. The PSLRA was enacted on December 22, 1995.
78. We intend to extend our analysis beyond 2000 in future work.
79. See Johnson et al., supra note 10.
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TABLE 1B: SAMPLE BY SIC CODE
SIC
Industry Type
Code
1000 Agriculture, Mining, Construction
2000 Textiles, Furniture, Chemicals and
Paper
3000 Plastics, Metals, Machinery and
Electronics
4000 Transportation and Communications
5000 Wholesale and Retail Trade
6000 Finance, Insurance and Real Estate
7000 Business and Miscellaneous Services
8000 Health, Educational, Engineering and
Accounting Services

Number
3
19

Percent of
Sample
1.5
9.3

71

34.8

15
17
1
70
8

7.4
8.3
0.5
34.3
3.9

For each of the firms in the sample, we collected data on the identity of
the plaintiff(s) and counsel. To determine the lead plaintiff, we looked at a
number of sources, including ISS’s Securities Class Action Services,
Stanford’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse, the web sites of several
claims administrators, the web sites of the major plaintiffs’ firms, court
cases contained in Westlaw, and SEC filing documents obtained through
EDGAR and Lexis. In some cases, we had information on the precise
identity of the lead plaintiff appointed by the court. In other cases, most
commonly pre-PSLRA cases, we took the named plaintiff(s) in the latest
documents we found for any particular litigation as the lead plaintiff.
The plaintiff’s identity is coded as an institution where any named lead
plaintiff in the litigation was a non-individual. As discussed above, we
find that this necessarily defines as institutions many trusts and investment
partnerships that are the functional equivalent of individual plaintiffs, as
well as mixed groups including at least one institution together with one or
more individual plaintiffs. We code public institutions such as government
pension funds separately.
We also collected data on the outcome of each suit (settlement,
including amount, or dismissal), the time from filing to resolution, the fees
awarded to the attorneys, and the court to which the case was assigned.
We obtained information on the resolution of suits from the same sources
that we searched for the lead plaintiff data. The Center for Research on
Security Prices (“CRSP”) provided data on market capitalization and
trading volume.
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VI. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Our first hypothesis, H1, postulates that institutions are no more likely
to represent the class in the post-PSLRA period than they were prior to the
law’s enactment. Table 2A depicts the breakdown between the institutions
and individuals over the studied period. Non-individual plaintiffs are a
constant presence over both the pre- and post-PSLRA periods, but there is
a discernible upward trend during the post-PSLRA period.
TABLE 2A: LEAD PLAINTIFFS

Institutional v. Individual Lead Plaintiffs
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Individual
Institution

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

Year

Table 2B compares the means of the pre- and post-PSLRA periods.
Institutions are represented with greater frequency, but the difference does
not reach the level of statistical significance. We caution here, however,
against extrapolating too much from this (non) result. Our sample size is
limited. More importantly, the anecdotal evidence suggests that
institutional investors have become more common as lead plaintiffs in the
last few years, a period not included in our sample.
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TABLE 2B: SAMPLE BY SIC CODE
Pre-PSLRA Fraction
with Institution Lead
Plaintiff

N

Post-PSLRA Fraction
with Institution Lead
Plaintiff

N

p-value

0.18

80

0.26

124

0.17

Our second hypothesis predicts that public pension funds became more
active as lead plaintiffs after the enactment of the PSLRA. Here we find
that the evidence strongly supports H2, with public pension funds going
from no representation in the pre-PSLRA period to over 10% of the cases
in the post-PSLRA period. The difference is significant at conventional
significance levels.
TABLE 2C: IDENTITY OF LEAD PLAINTIFF
Panel 1
Type

Pre-PSLRA Percent

Individual

66

82.5%

92

74.2%

Private Institution 14

17.5%

19

15.3%

Public Pension

0

0.0%

13

10.5%

80

100.0%

124

100.0%

Total

Pearson chi-squared(3) = 9.14; Prob = 0.03

Post-PSLRA

Percent
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Panel 2

Lead Plaintiff Breakdown
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Individual
Public Pension
Private Institution

2000

1999
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1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

Year

H3 predicts that institutions are more likely to intervene when the
potential damages are greater and the evidence of fraud is stronger. For
securities class action in our sample, we calculated the potential secondary
market damages. To do so, we followed the methodology used by Jim Cox
and Randall Thomas in recent work.80 First, we estimated a market model
to generate expected stock market returns for each firm. The market model
is estimated using returns for each firm for the one-year period ending six
months prior to the beginning of the class period.81 Second, we assumed
that the closing price on the day after the end of the class period represents
the price after the market has fully taken into account the revelation of the
fraud involved in the class action (termed the “benchmark” price). We use
the estimated market model to generate the value line, working backward
in time from the date of the benchmark price to the beginning of the class
period. Third, we separated traders into high-activity and low-activity
traders using the same assumptions from Cox and Thomas.82 Using these
80. See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry,
53 DUKE L.J. 737, 768 n.100 (2003).
81. See id. (“We terminated our β calculations six months before the commencement of the class
action period because our data sample consistently reflected abnormal stock price behavior in the
three-month to six-month period before the commencement of the class period.”).
82. See id at 769 n.100. (citing Marcia Kramer Mayer, Best-Fit Estimation of Damage Volume in
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assumptions, we adjusted the trading volume for each day in the class
period, as apportioned between high-activity and low-activity trades, to
account for the probability that shares purchased on a particular day in the
class period may turnover before the end of the class period.83 Lastly, for
each day in the class period, we multiplied the adjusted trading volume
against the difference between the actual price and the value line for that
day to determine potential damages for those who purchased on that
particular day and held their shares to the end of the class period. We
summed the potential damages for each day in the class period to generate
a total potential damage award (termed the “stakes”).
Table 3A presents the stakes available by lead plaintiff type. We find
no significant difference, either before or after the PSLRA, in the cases
involving private institutions. The story is different, however, with regard
to public pension funds as lead plaintiffs. The public pension funds are
involved, on average, in cases seeking nearly three times the damages as
those cases in which the class is represented by an individual or
individuals as lead plaintiff. The difference falls just short of statistical
significance at the 10% confidence level.
TABLE 3A: AVERAGE STAKES BY TYPE OF PLAINTIFF
Individual

N

Private Institution

N

p-value

pre-PSLRA

683.5

65

260.4

14

0.61

post-PSLRA

1015.7

90

938.1

18

0.93

Individual

N

Public Pension

N

p-value

1015.7

90

2784.6

13

0.12

post-PSLRA

Stakes are millions of dollars, adjusted to 2000 dollars using the CPI.

Shareholder Class Actions: The Multi-Sector, Multi-Trader Model of Investor Behavior 110 (Nat’l
Econ. Research Ass’ns, Working Paper, 2000)). Cox and Thomas assume that “low-activity traders
hold about 63 percent of the shares and account for 17 percent of the trading, so that high-activity
traders hold 37 percent of the shares and account for 83 percent of the trading.” See id.
83. Here we follow the method outlined in Willard T. Carleton et al., Securities Class Action
Lawsuits: A Descriptive Study, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 491, 496–97 (1996) for the two-trader model.
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Are institutions becoming involved only in cases involving the
strongest evidence of fraud? In other words, are institutions “cherrypicking” the strongest cases? To evaluate the cherry-picking possibility,
we consider one measure of the pre-filing strength of the cases in which
pension funds take on the lead plaintiff role compared to other cases—the
presence of an accounting restatement or an SEC investigation. We
present these findings in Table 3B.
TABLE 3B: PRESENCE OF PRE-FILING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
OF EARNING RESTATEMENT OR SEC INVESTIGATION RELATING
TO CLASS PERIOD
Public Pensions N
post-PSLRA 0.462

All Other Lead Plaintiffs

13 0.225

N

p-value

111 0.064

Restatements resulting from an accounting rule change, change of control, spin-off, or
other non-fraud or mistake related reason are not counted.

Of the thirteen securities class actions with a public pension fund lead
plaintiff in the post-PSRLA period, six (46%) of the defendant firms made
an announcement relating to an accounting restatement or an SEC
investigation prior to the filing of the first complaint. In comparison, only
25 out of the 111 cases (23%) with other types of lead plaintiff had a
similar red flag. This difference is significant at the 10% confidence level.
These results, combined with the data on stakes reported in Table 3A,
suggest that public pensions tended to target both larger stakes cases and
those with stronger evidence of fraud.
H4 predicts that institutions are less likely to retain Milberg Weiss as
lead counsel. This prediction is only partially borne out. Table 4A shows
that private institutions are not significantly less likely to retain Milberg
Weiss, before or after the PSLRA. Public pension funds, however, are
substantially less likely to retain that firm post-PSLRA.84 Among all lead
plaintiffs, the presence of Milberg Weiss is little changed across the pre- to
post-PSLRA periods as reported in Table 4B.
84. We note that this result may not persist for time periods subsequent to our study. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that the Milberg Weiss firm has been increasingly involved in the representation of
public pension funds. See, e.g., Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp., Sec. Litig.), 206 F.R.D. 427
(S.D. Tex. 2002) (appointing the Regents of the University of California as lead plaintiff and Milberg
Weiss as lead counsel).
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TABLE 4A: CHOICE OF MILBERG WEISS BY PLAINTIFF TYPE
Individual

N

Private Institution

N

p-value

pre-PSLRA

0.517

58

0.462

13

0.72

post-PSLRA

0.550

91

0.421

19

0.31

Individual

N

Public Pension

N

p-value

0.550

91

0.231

13

0.03

post-PSLRA

TABLE 4B: CHOICE OF MILBERG WEISS BY ALL LEAD PLAINTIFFS
Pre-PSLRA Fraction
with Milberg Weiss

N

Post-PSLRA Fraction
with Milberg Weiss

N

p-value

0.51

71

0.50

123

0.88

Our next set of hypotheses addresses the question of whether
institutional involvement as lead plaintiff makes a difference in terms of
the outcome for the class. Do institutional investors produce greater
recovery for investors? Do hard bargaining and greater sophistication lead
to fee agreements that lower the percentage of the recovery going to the
attorneys?
H5 predicts that an institutional lead plaintiff is likely to correlate with
greater recovery for the class. Table 5A compares the outcomes based on
the type of lead plaintiff. As a proxy for litigation success, we divide the
settlement achieved by the stakes at issue. We define a “high-value
outcome” as an outcome involving a settlement of more than 5% of the
stakes.85 Thus, we deem litigation that results in a $1 million settlement
85. A settlement-to-stakes ratio of 5% results in roughly one-third of the suits qualifying as highoutcome suits. While admittedly somewhat arbitrary, the 5% threshold provides a rough way of
separating suits with a high likelihood of merit. For robustness, we rerun the tests using a 10%
settlement-to-stakes ratio cutoff for high outcome suits (resulting in approximately 20% of the suits
qualifying as high-outcome). We obtain qualitatively similar results as in Tables 5A and 5B. In the
post-PSLRA period, the coefficient on private institution is positive and significant at the 10%
confidence level. The coefficient on public pension, while positive, is now statistically insignificant.
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where the stakes involved are $1 billion as far less successful than if the
stakes involved are $1.1 million.
Table 5A reports the percentage of each type of plaintiff producing a
high-value outcome. We see that private institutions tend to correlate with
a lower-value outcome prior to the PSLRA, although the difference is not
significant. Public pension funds are more likely to have a high-value
outcome, as predicted by H5, but, again, the difference is not significant.
TABLE 5A: HIGH-VALUE OUTCOME BY PLAINTIFF TYPE
Individual

N

Private Institution

N

p-value

pre-PSLRA

0.477

65

0.357

14

0.42

post-PSLRA

0.289

90

0.316

19

0.82

Individual

N

Public Pension

N

p-value

0.289

90

0.462

13

0.21

post-PSLRA

High-Value Outcome defined as settlement for more than 5% of damages estimate.

At first glance, the results for private institutions in particular are
somewhat puzzling. Why aren’t private institutions falling in line with the
prediction of Weiss and Beckerman and generating larger settlement
awards as a fraction of the stakes for the class as a whole? One anecdotal
answer is that mutual funds such as Vanguard and Fidelity are not getting
involved as lead plaintiff. This reluctance was little changed by the
PSLRA. In the Appendix, we report the identities of the different private
institutional lead plaintiffs in the pre- and post-PSLRA periods. While we
leave a more detailed examination of the backgrounds of the institutional
lead plaintiffs for future research, we note that in both the pre- and postPSLRA periods, the private institutional lead plaintiffs are relatively small,
unknown institutions. If the goal of the lead plaintiff provision was to
We do not use a linear measure of the settlement amount/stakes ratio as our dependent variable
because a properly-specified regression model with this variable would require an independent
variable measuring directors’ and officers’ insurance coverage. The availability of insurance is a
critical factor in assessing settlement amounts, but this data is not publicly available.
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encourage large mutual funds to participate more actively in securities
fraud litigation, the PSLRA has failed.
To better assess the effect of having an institutional investor as a lead
plaintiff on recovery for the class, we ran a logistic regression using our
High-Value Outcome variable as the dependent variable (1=High-Value
Outcome; 0=not). In addition to the independent variables of interest,
Private Institution and Pension Fund (dummy variables coded as one for
private institutions and public pension funds respectively), we include as
control variables the log of market capitalization (a dummy variable coded
as one if Milberg Weiss represented the class) and a Busy Court dummy
variable (coded as one for district courts in California and the Southern
District of New York). These courts see substantially greater numbers of
securities fraud class actions; judges’ familiarity with this type of litigation
may lead them to take a different approach to these cases. We also include
a dummy variable for Prefiling Hard Evidence, defined to equal one if a
public announcement of an earnings accounting restatement or SEC
investigation relating to the class period is made prior to the first filing of
suit. Restatements resulting from an accounting rule change, change of
control, spin-off, or other non-fraud or mistake-related reason are not
counted. Note that Prefiling Hard Evidence is not included in the prePSLRA model as Prefiling Hard Evidence is perfectly correlated with a
High-Value Outcome.
TABLE 5B: HIGH-VALUE OUTCOME LOGISTIC REGRESSION
Pre-PSLRA
Variable

Coefficient

z

P > |z|

Constant

2.76

3.78

<0.01

Private Institution

−0.14

−0.31

0.76

Market Cap (log)

−0.51

−3.97

<0.01

Milberg

−0.23

−0.55

0.58

.94

2.29

0.02

Busy Court
Pseudo R2 = 0.28

N = 69
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Coefficient

z

P > |z|

Constant

0.97

1.81

0.07

Private Institution

0.35

0.99

0.32

Pension Fund

0.80

1.64

0.10

Market Cap (log)

−0.25

−3.06

<0.01

Milberg

−0.31

−1.15

0.25

0.13

0.44

0.66

0.29

0.94

0.35

Busy Court
Prefiling Hard
Evidence
Pseudo R2 = 0.12

N = 120

Dependent variable is equal to one if the suit resulted in a High-Value Outcome and zero
otherwise.

The pre-PSLRA regression partly confirms the results of the univariate
comparison in Table 5A—we find no significant effect from the presence
of the private institution as a lead plaintiff. This result carries over to the
post-PSLRA period. On the other hand, we do find that pension funds
correlate with a significantly greater outcome for the class in the postPSLRA period (significant at the 10% confidence level).
These findings may be sensitive to our approach and, in particular, to
our method of defining a High-Value Outcome. As a robustness check
(results not tabulated), we ran a separate set of regressions defining a highvalue outcome for our dependent variable as a settlement of more than
0.5% of market capitalization (measured ten days prior to class end date),
the threshold used to distinguish “meritorious” suits by Johnson, Nelson,
and Pritchard.86 The coefficient for private institutions continues to be
insignificant. We again find that pension funds are significantly more
likely to be involved in a case producing a High-Value Outcome under
this definition (now at the 1% confidence level).
H6 predicts that institutions will bargain for lower class counsel fees.
Because attorneys’ fees in these cases are almost always based on the
percentage-of-recovery method, we focus on the fee award as a percent of
the overall recovery. Table 6A compares fee awards in cases led by
86. See Johnson et al., supra note 10.
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individual plaintiffs with those in cases led by institutional investors. We
find no significant difference between individuals and private institutions,
but we do find that public pension funds pay roughly five percentage
points less than individuals. This difference is statistically significant and,
potentially, economically quite important. When we compare the dollar
figures, however, we see that pension funds are paying significantly
greater fee amounts than individuals, presumably reflecting the fact that
pension funds are participating in the higher-stakes cases. Because courts
typically award a declining percentage of the overall recovery as recovery
size increases,87 we need to control for case size in order to assess the
effect of institutional participation.
TABLE 6A: ATTORNEY FEES BY PLAINTIFF TYPE
Fees as Percentage of Settlement
Individual

N

pre-PSLRA

0.32

42

Private
Institution
0.32

post-PSLRA

0.30

56

Individual
0.30

post-PSLRA

N

p-value

8

0.80

0.31

14

0.46

N

Public Pension

N

p-value

56

0.25

11

<0.01

N

p-value

8

0.47

Fees in Millions of (2000) Dollars
Individual

N

pre-PSLRA

3.69

42

Private
Institution
1.79

post-PSLRA

2.35

56

10.02

14

<0.01

Individual

N

Public Pension

N

p-value

2.35

56

16.43

11

<0.01

post-PSLRA

87. See, e.g., Krell v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales
Practices Litig.), 148 F.3d 283, 339 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that “percentage awards generally decrease
as the amount of the recovery increases”).
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To get a fuller understanding of the relation between the type of lead
plaintiff and attorneys’ fees, we ran an ordinary least squares regression
with the log odds transformation of the attorneys’ fee percentage of the
settlement as our dependent variable.88 Do private institutions and/or
pension funds manage to limit the amount of fees paid to the attorneys?
Table 6B presents the results of our attorneys’ fees regression. In
addition to the independent variables in the High-Value Outcome
regression above, we also include a variable for the time between filing
and resolution. Cases that take a longer time to resolve may require more
attorney time and therefore justify a greater fee award. We include dummy
variables corresponding to each of the ten deciles for the litigation stakes.
Much of the work and effort on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys is relatively
fixed, increasing only marginally with the overall size of the litigation.
Attorneys’ fees as a percentage of the recovery therefore are likely to
decrease with the size of the litigation as measured by the stakes variable.
Including decile dummies for the range of litigation stakes provides a
control for this size effect on attorney fee awards as a percentage of the
recovery.89
Additionally, an attorney’s performance may affect the fee award. In
particular, we expect attorney’s fees to be higher when the attorney has
produced a High-Value Outcome, as measured by a settlement reflecting a
higher percentage of the stakes. To capture this possibility, we include a
dummy variable for whether the litigation resulted in a settlement of
greater than 5% of the stakes as a proxy of a High-Value Outcome.90
88. The log odds of the attorney fee fraction of the settlement is equal to ln (attorney fee
fraction/(1-attorney fee fraction)).
89. The coefficients on the stakes decile variables are generally in the predicted direction; we
have omitted them from the table, however, for clarity of presentation.
90. For a discussion on the High Value Outcome variable, see supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
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TABLE 6B: ATTORNEYS’ FEES REGRESSIONS
Pre-PSLRA
Variable

Coefficient

t-statistic

Prob>|t|

Constant

−1.00

−3.90

<0.01

Private Institution

0.02

0.41

0.69

Market Cap (log)

−0.03

−1.38

0.18

High Value Outcome

0.08

0.92

0.37

Milberg

0.13

3.30

<0.01

Busy Court

−0.00

−0.07

0.95

Prefiling Hard Evidence

−0.06

−0.50

0.62

0.04

1.23

0.23

Resolution Days (log)
Adjusted R2 = 0.17
Post-PSLRA
Variable

N = 46

Coefficient

t-statistic

Prob>|t|

Constant

−0.81

−1.73

0.09

Private Institution

0.16

1.73

0.09

Pension Fund

−0.03

-0.28

0.77

Market Cap (log)

0.00

0.06

0.96

High Value Outcome

-0.10

-1.47

0.15

Milberg

0.12

1.73

0.09

Busy Court

−0.10

−1.47

0.15

Prefiling Hard Evidence

−0.18

−2.10

0.04

Resolution Days (log)

0.01

0.13

0.90

Adjusted R2 = 0.19

N = 78

Dependent variable for both regressions is the log odds transformation of the attorneys’ fee
percentage of the settlement.
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In the pre-PSLRA period, we see that private institutions had no
significant effect on attorneys’ fees. Looking at the other variables, we see
that Milberg Weiss generally commanded higher fees. In the post-PSLRA
period, the coefficient on the Milberg Weiss dummy remains positive and
statistically significant. Post-PSLRA, we also find a significant positive
correlation between fees and the presence of a private institution. Private
institutions are clearly not keeping fees in check. The coefficient on the
public pension fund variable is negative, but it is not statistically
significant. We conclude that our sample does not support the hypothesis
that institutional lead plaintiffs help to keep attorneys’ fees in check.
The only other variable that is significant in the post-PSLRA period is
the Prefiling Hard Evidence dummy variable, which has a negative
coefficient. Courts are apparently less generous with plaintiffs’ attorneys
when the attorneys are provided with objective evidence suggesting fraud
before the suit is filed.
VII. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Our empirical findings offer insight into the effect of the PSLRA on
institutional participation in securities litigation. Contrary to popular
belief, institutions did participate in litigation prior to the adoption of the
PSLRA, typically as part of lead plaintiff groups. The pre-PSLRA
institutional plaintiffs, however, appear to have been largely
indistinguishable from individual plaintiffs, both in the size of their stakes
and their effect on litigation outcomes. Following the adoption of the
PSLRA, institutional lead plaintiffs, collectively, continue to have no
statistically significant effect.
The most significant change in lead plaintiff identity subsequent to the
adoption of the PSLRA is the emergence of public pension funds as class
representatives. Public pension funds seem to possess precisely the
attributes envisioned by Congress—substantial litigation stakes and a level
of sophistication that enables them to monitor class counsel actively. The
question remains, however, whether public pension funds are having a
meaningful effect on settlement sizes or attorneys’ fee awards. We report
evidence that public pension fund participation is correlated with a greater
likelihood of a High-Value Outcome from litigation. We also provide
evidence, however, consistent with the view that public pension funds are
simply cherry-picking by participating in cases in which characteristics
observable prior to the filing of suit indicate the case is likely to result in a
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large settlement. Because of our sample size, we cannot draw definitive
conclusions from these results. This possibility warrants further study
before any firm conclusion can be drawn. Moreover, we find no
statistically significant correlation between public pension fund
participation and reduced fee awards. Accordingly, at least through the end
of 2000, public pension fund involvement does not seem to be realizing
the potential hoped for by Congress.
There are several possible explanations. One may be that agency
problems limit the effectiveness even of public pension funds. As
government actors subject to political influence, public pension funds may
actively seek involvement in high-profile cases, such as Cendant and
Enron, but may add little affirmative value to the litigation process.
Alternatively, public pension funds may focus on politically salient results
such as the adoption of corporate governance reforms or the contribution
of settlement funds by individual defendants, instead of seeking to
maximize the class recovery.91 A third possibility is that, in strong cases
involving substantial stakes, institutions may prefer to opt out of class
litigation to bring their own individual action. This option is likely to
produce a faster and possibly higher recovery for the institution but
eliminates the institution as a potential lead plaintiff in the class suit.
Some evidence does exist that the post-PSLRA period correlates with
reduced attorneys’ fee awards for Milberg Weiss, all other things being
equal.92 This difference does not persist, however, when we include
control variables in our multi-variate logistic regression. Millberg’s
presence correlates with a higher fee award both before and after the
PSLRA. Our study also indicates that Milberg Weiss is less likely to
represent public pension funds in the post-PSLRA period, at least during
the time period we examine. These findings may indicate increased
competition among plaintiffs’ attorneys firms to become lead counsel.
Alternatively, because our study focuses on the time period immediately
after the adoption of the PSLRA, our findings may indicate differing
responses among plaintiffs’ firms to the statute, in which case we would
91. It is not clear that this result is undesirable. Public pension fund involvement may have the
effect of making private litigation function more like public enforcement which values deterrence and
accountability in addition to compensation. See Jill E. Fisch, Class Action Reform, Qui Tam, and the
Role of the Plaintiff, 60 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 175–76, 198 (1997) (observing that focus on
deterrence objective lowers the conceptual barrier between private litigation and government
enforcement actions).
92. On a summary statistic level, the mean attorney fee percentage of the settlement award for
Milberg Weiss in the pre-PSLRA period was 32.6% compared with only 30.3% in the post-PSLRA
period (difference significant at the 1% level).
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expect to see the effect disappear in future years. In particular, we note
that the overall frequency with which Milberg Weiss appears as a lead
counsel does not change between the pre- and post-PSLRA periods.
Finally, we observe that the stated congressional preference for
institutional lead plaintiffs and the statutory authority conferred by the
lead plaintiff provision do not appear to have enhanced the role of
institutions other than public pension funds in monitoring class counsel.
Other institutions such as hedge funds and private pension funds, when
they participate as lead plaintiffs, do not seem to have an effect on the
litigation. Because some of these institutions, particularly hedge funds,
seem to possess the substantial stakes and sophistication to enable them to
function more effectively, the question of why they have failed to do so is
an important subject for future research. In particular, it is worth exploring
whether courts are inappropriately restricting institutional influence by
appointing lead plaintiff groups or by questioning the ability of institutions
to meet the typicality requirement of Rule 23.
VIII. CONCLUSION
After ten years of experience under the PSLRA, courts are still
struggling with how best to interpret and implement the lead plaintiff
provision. With this provision, Congress intended to encourage
institutional involvement in securities fraud litigation. The hope was that
institution would help produce better litigation outcomes for shareholders
at a lower cost. Our study offers preliminary evidence on whether
Congress has achieved these objectives.
On the issue of institutional participation, we find that the PSLRA has
had an effect on the participation of only one type of institution—the
public pension fund. Public pension fund participation as lead plaintiff has
increased substantially since 1995 and continues to increase. Beyond the
public pension fund, however, institutional participation remains
unchanged. Levels of overall institutional participation remain relatively
consistent. Private institutions that participate tend to be relatively small,
both pre- and post-PSLRA. Other large institutions, particularly mutual
funds, have failed to participate at all.
As for the effects of institutional participation, our data show only
mixed results. Public pension funds correlate with a greater likelihood of a
High-Value Outcome. We are unable, however, to rule out the possibility
that public pensions are selectively participating in only those cases with
the largest potential damages and the most glaring indicia of fraud. We
also find that when we control for the size of the case, institutional
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participation—even pension fund participation—does not correlate with
lower attorney fee awards. At this point, the case for the lead plaintiff
provision has not yet been proven.
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APPENDIX–LIST OF INSTITUTIONS IN THE DATA SET
Pre-PSLRA Private Institutions
Acker Capital Partnership
D.M.D. Pension Trust
Jefferson Heritage Partners, Ltd.
Minnick Capital Management
Overseas Corporation
Peregrine Options, Inc.
Pisnoi Lumber & Trim Co., Inc., Pension Trust
S.H.E. Medical Associates, P.C.
Sidney Weinstein, Trustee for the Marigold Marketing Profit Sharing Plan
Software Design Systems, Inc.
TDA Trading Corp.
World Futures Trading Company
ZSA Asset Allocation Fund and ZSA Equity Fund
ZVI Trading Corp Employees' Money Purchase Pension Plan
Post-PSLRA Private Institutions
American Bancredit Corp
Androsia International Trade
Brenner Clinical Psych P.C. Pension Plan & Trust
Bulldog Capital Management LP
De Wind Partners LP
Emanon Partners LP
Federal National Insurance Co.
Fuller & Thaler Asset Management, Inc.
Glyn Emerging Opportunity Fund, LP
Golfway Developments, Inc.
Great Neck Capital Appreciation Partnership LP
Imperial Equity of Nevada Inc.
Lion Holdings LLC, King Asset Trust
Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund
Nature Shoes Inc.
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Nomanbhoy Group
Perkins Partners I LTD
Teamsters Local 175 & 505 Pension Trust Fund Plan and Local 144
Nursing Home Pension Fund
VIP World Asset Mgmt, T.F.M. Investment Group
Post-PSLRA Public Pensions
Birmingham Retirement & Relief Fund
City of Philadelphia Board of Pension & Retirement
Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds
Florida State Board of Administration and Louisiana State Employees’
Retirement System
Kansas Farm Bureau Pension Trust and Kansas Farm Bureau Mutual
Insurance Co.
Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System and Louisiana
School Employees' Retirement System
Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System
New Hampshire Retirement System
Philadelphia Board of Pensions & Retirement
Police and Firemen Retirement System of City of Detroit

